Average CEO remuneration in the DAX was €6.1 million in 2025, almost double the €3.3 million earned by other board members in the same year, according to calculations by the Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW) and the Technical University of Munich.
New 2025 remuneration data
The figures were released in a Handelsblatt article on 13 August 2026, which quoted the joint DSW/TU München study. The study covers all listed companies that form the DAX index and presents a clean, comparable snapshot of top‑level pay for the most recent fiscal year.
CEO pay grew 6.8 % year‑on‑year (2025 versus 2024), while compensation for the remaining board members rose only 1.5 % over the same period. Both growth rates are explicitly stated in the Handelsblatt piece, which attributes them to the underlying DSW and TU München calculations.
Breakdown of CEO versus board pay
Table 1 summarises the two groups, their average remuneration and the respective YoY growth rates.
| Group | Average remuneration (€ / year) | YoY growth |
|---|---|---|
| CEOs | 6.1 million | 6.8 % |
| Other board members | 3.3 million | 1.5 % |
| Source: Handelsblatt (citing DSW & TU München) | ||
The gap between the two groups is not only absolute but also accelerating. In 2024, the average CEO package was €5.7 million, a 4 % increase over 2023, while the average for other directors rose 3.5 % that year. The 2025 jump to 6.8 % for CEOs therefore represents a notable uptick relative to the prior year’s modest growth.
Marc Tüngler, chief executive of DSW, interpreted the numbers as evidence of “new power dynamics” that are “due to the uncertain times”. His comment appears verbatim in the Handelsblatt article and underscores the perception that CEOs are increasingly decoupling their compensation from that of their peers.
For shareholders, the widening disparity raises questions about alignment of incentives. A CEO earning almost twice as much as the rest of the board may have a stronger bargaining position in remuneration negotiations, potentially influencing board decisions on risk‑taking, capital allocation and strategic direction.
Regulators have been monitoring executive pay across Europe, and the German corporate governance code stresses proportionality and transparency. The DSW/TU München data provide a concrete benchmark that could inform future revisions of the code, especially if the trend continues.
Institutional investors that hold significant stakes in DAX constituents are likely to scrutinise proxy voting recommendations more closely. The 6.8 % YoY rise for CEOs, contrasted with a modest 1.5 % increase for peers, suggests that remuneration committees may be rewarding top‑level performance—or market perception of it—disproportionately.
From a market‑pricing perspective, the data could affect analyst models that factor executive compensation into cost‑of‑capital calculations. Higher CEO pay may be interpreted as a proxy for higher expected firm performance, but the divergence also introduces a risk premium if investors view the gap as a governance red flag.
What remains unknown
The packet does not disclose the distribution of pay within each group, such as median versus mean, nor does it break out the components of total remuneration (salary, bonuses, long‑term incentives, stock options). Without that granularity, it is unclear how much of the increase is driven by variable pay versus fixed salary.
Additionally, the study does not identify which specific DAX companies are outliers on either side of the average. Knowing whether the gap is driven by a handful of mega‑caps or is pervasive across the index would help investors assess the systemic nature of the trend.
Finally, the DSW/TU München methodology, while cited, is not reproduced in the packet. Details on how the averages were calculated—whether weighted by market capitalisation or by headcount—remain opaque.
These gaps point to areas for further research, but the headline numbers are clear: DAX CEOs earned €6.1 million on average in 2025, nearly twice the €3.3 million earned by their fellow directors, and their compensation grew at a rate more than four times that of the rest of the board.